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Louis Althusser and the End of Classical Russian 
Marxism: Spinoza, Hegel and the Critique of 
Dogmatic Marxism 
 
Everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as 
Substance, but also as Subject. 
Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit1 
 
Introduction 
At the time of the personal catastrophe that in 1980 ended both the life of Hélène 
Althusser and, in my opinion, the intellectually productive life of Louis Althusser,2 
the reputation in the English-speaking world of Louis Althusser’s contribution to 
Marxist philosophy had been very much diminished by sustained, vehement and 
successful attack.3 The extent of the success of this attack was perhaps made most 
                                                 
1 Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977 
[1807]) (hereinafter PS) p. 10 (para. 1). 
2 Louis Althusser, The Future Lasts a Long Time (London: Verso, 1994) is a morbidly 
fascinating book, but such theoretical interest as it has arises only because of what 
Althusser had achieved before 1980. See Gabriel Albiac, ‘Althusser, Reader of 
Althusser: Autobiography as Fictional Genre’, Rethinking Marxism, 10:3 (1998), pp. 
80-89 and Gregory Eliott, ‘Analysis Terminated; Analysis Interminable: The Case of 
Louis Althusser’ in Gregory Eliott (ed) Althusser: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1994). (I understand the French original of The Future Lasts a Long Time 
contains a chapter on Spinoza not translated into English and on which I therefore 
cannot comment). 
3 eg Simon Clarke et al (eds) One-dimensional Marxism (London: Allison and Busby, 
1980). For a general review see Gregory Elliot, Althusser: The Detour of Theory 
(London: Verso, 1987). 
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evident, not by any explicit critique, but by Kolakowski’s contemptuous dismissal of 
Althusser in Main Currents of Marxism,4 which set at nought, or less than nought, the 
most celebrated Marxist contribution to social theory and philosophy in the twenty 
years prior to the appearance of Kolakowski’s book. Since his death, Althusser’s 
reputation has begun to be revived, but, despite the interest of the issues raised by this 
revival,5 I think it must be said that this is the case only for those sympathetic to 
Marxism.6 Even for that group, Althusser’s reputation still enjoys nothing like the 
status it did in, say, the years after the appearance in 1972 of Politics and History,7 
the last of the initial tranche of excellent editions of Althusser which made his key 
works available in English. Perhaps this is right for, much more than one would 
normally think fit (in contradiction of Althusser’s own conception of reading), one 
must distinguish what is of possible value and what is of no possible value whatsoever 
in the philosophy of Louis Althusser if one is now to draw on that philosophy, and, 
                                                 
4 Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) 
vol. 3, pp. 483-87. Kolakowski had discussed Althusser at greater length in Leszek 
Kolakowski, ‘Althusser’s Marx’, Socialist Register, 8 (1971), pp. 111-28. In essence, 
this paper is written because I am in basic agreement with Kolakowski’s claim 
(despite the way it is put) that Althusser’s philosophy represents ‘a return to old-
fashioned Communist bigotry’, but am in basic disagreement with his claim that 
‘Althusser did not make any fresh contribution to theory’: ibid., 486. 
5 eg E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (eds) The Althusserian Legacy (London: 
Verso, 1993). For a general review see Luke Ferretter, Louis Althusser (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2005). 
6 Tony Judt, ‘Elucubrations: The ‘Marxism’ of Louis Althusser’ in Reappraisals 
(London: Vintage Books, 2009). This criticism of Althusser was first published in 
1994 and reprinted without amendment in 2008. 
7 Louis Althusser, Politics and History (London: New Left Books, 1972). 
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especially with the additions to his published oeuvre of works he wrote since 1980,8 
the latter part is very much the larger. 
 Accepting as I do the very considerable value of core elements of Althusser’s 
social theory, I do not propose to even minimally review the positive re-evaluations 
that have been made of this part of his work.9 Rather, I want to focus on a position 
many of these re-evaluations have adopted which, though it has been expressed in 
works of great interest, will, I think, ultimately prove unhelpful to that re-evaluation. 
It is the position – indeed a very Althusserian position in that recalls the dialectical 
materialist stress on what Kolakowski called ‘integrality’10 - that it is necessary to 
find something of fundamental value in Althusser’s explicit epistemology in order to 
justify finding something of fundamental value in his social theory. This position is 
exemplified in Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff’s very thought-provoking New 
Departures in Marxist Theory.11 Resnick and Wolff insist on the importance of 
Althusser’s conceptualisation of contradiction in terms of overdetermination, and 
identify its key value as the way that its principled ‘critique of determinism’12 allows 
us to conceive of the role of contradiction in the materialist conception of history in 
                                                 
8 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter (London: Verso, 2006). For 
evaluations of this work quite at variance with mine see Warren Montag, ‘The Late 
Althusser: Materialism of the Encounter or Philosophy of Nothing?’ Culture, Theory 
and Critique, 51:2 (2010) pp. 157-70; Katja Diefenbach et al (eds) Encountering 
Althusser (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) and Fernanda Navarro, ‘An 
Encounter with Althusser’, Rethinking Marxism, 10:3 (1998), pp. 93-98. 
9 For such a review see Robert Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist 
Social Theory (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).  
10 Kolakowski, op. cit., vol 2, p. 340. 
11 Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, New Departures in Marxian Theory 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
12 Ibid., p. 68. 
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coherently ‘anti-essentialist’13 terms. I believe this is the core of what is important in 
Althusser’s work, and that, because of it, Althusser’s work is, as Resnick and Wollf 
say, ‘one of the greatest contributions in the Marxism tradition’.14 Resnick and Wolff, 
and others taking a similar line, are performing a signal service by reviving this aspect 
of Althusser’s thought. 
 Unfortunately, Resnick and Wolff maintain that this anti-essentialism in 
Althusser’s social theory is inextricably linked to a claimed anti-essentialism in his 
epistemology, which they believe is a contribution of similar value. Though they seem 
to have more reservations about Althusser’s epistemology than they do about his 
social theory, they argue it is a contribution of similar weight and, indeed, give an 
account of Althusser’s epistemology in terms which themselves involve 
‘overdetermination and complex contradiction’.15 They argue that Althusser moved 
away from a strong distinction between science (Marxism) and ideology (bourgeois 
thought) and set up a workable pluralism, so that, at its core, ‘the Althusserian critique 
… implies that Marxism can no longer be held up as science and non-Marxism as 
ideology’.16 If I may quote at length: 
Although influenced deeply by the non-Marxist intellectual currents 
swirling around him, Althusser did nonetheless begin to fashion a 
distinctively Marxian epistemology. It broke radically from the 
essentialist epistemologies of traditional social theory, Marxist and non-
Marxist. It deployed concepts of overdetermination and complex 
contradiction to champion truths instead of truth, differences amongst a 
multiplicity of theories rather than dogmatic adherence to an absolute 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 79. 
14 Ibid., p. 68. 
15 Ibid., p. 75. 
16 Ibid., p. 73. 
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standard. Finally, it avoided the theoretical relativism that might otherwise 
attend such a position by articulating a basis for theoretical partisanship 
among alternative truths developed in and by alternative social theories. 
 From such an epistemological standpoint, the statements made 
within any theoretical project are interrogated in terms of their social 
conditions and consequences. Based on that interrogation, the statements 
will be accepted, rejected, or transformed for insertion into Marxian social 
theory. Marxian social theorists will take positions toward and make 
alliances with proponents of other theories based precisely on its 
assessment of the social conditions and consequences of these theories. 
All truths and theories are not equally valid or acceptable from this 
standpoint.  
 They are not accepted or rejected on the grounds of some absolute 
standard of a singular truth; such a protocol is exactly what Althusser’s 
epistemological position rules out. They are all treated as theories with 
their truths; no epistemological basis exists for their rejection or 
acceptance. Rather such a basis exists on the different level of an analysis 
of each theory’s social conditions of existence and its social 
consequences. That is why Althusser’s distinctive Marxian epistemology 
is neither a relativism nor a postmodernism.17 
 The epistemology Resnick and Wolff outline may itself be basically sound. I 
myself do not think so as I believe its pluralism is irretrievably relativist, though they 
categorically deny this. But, however this is, I cannot, I am afraid, concede that, in its 
pluralism, it has any plausibility whatsoever as an account of Althusser’s own 
epistemology, which rested on a dogmatic distinction between science and truth 
derived from Spinoza, who was, I presume, the principal ‘non-Marxian intellectual 
[current] swirling around Althusser’ which Resnick and Wolff had in mind. 
Obviously, it is Hegel who is the principal such current swirling around most western 
Marxism, and it is extremely important to appreciate the political significance of the 
fact that that Althusser made such a determined effort to replace Hegel with Spinoza 
in the interpretation of Marx’s thought. 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 75. 
 6 
 
 The significance of the position taken by contributors such as Resnick and 
Wolff is that it shows us that, even now, the democratic unacceptability of Althusser’s 
Spinozist epistemology is not appreciated, and, indeed, that epistemology is being 
reasserted in a rather direct manner.18 Valuable contributions by Warren Montag19 
and others have deepened our appreciation of the depth of the Spinozist influence on 
Althusser and his contemporaries,20 and many important texts have now been made 
available in English.21 In my own opinion, earlier work particularly by Christopher 
Norris22 had already clearly put Spinozist dogmatism at the heart of Althusser’s 
epistemology. I believe that, following a tradition of Marxist acknowledgement of 
Spinozist influence which can be traced to Plekhanov,23 Althusser gave the fullest 
                                                 
18 Warren Montag, ‘Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics: Interpretation or 
Intervention?’ in Kaplan and Sprinker (eds) op. cit. For a general review see Peter 
Thomas, ‘Philosophical Strategies: Althusser and Spinoza’, Historical Materialism, 
10:3 (2002), pp. 71-113. 
19 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power (London: Verso, 1999) and Warren 
Montag, Louis Althusser (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
20 Warren Montag, Althusser and His Contemporaries (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2013). 
21 eg Étienne Balibar, Spinoza and Politics (London: Verso, 1998); Gilles Deleuze, 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1990); Pierre 
Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza? (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
2012) and the essays collected in Pierre Macherey, In a Materialist Way (London: 
Verso, 1998) pt 3 and in Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (eds) The New Spinoza 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). Of course, many important 
texts remain untranslated, including a five volume commentary on the Ethics by 
Macherey. For a general review see Wiep van Bungee, ‘Spinoza Past and Present’ in 
Spinoza: Past and Present (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 
22 Christopher Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991) ch. 1. The first identification in English of the Spinozist 
elements in Althusser of which I am aware was Perry Anderson, Considerations on 
Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976) pp. 64-66.  
23 G. V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1962 [1908]) pp. 19-20. See further Daniela Steila, Genesis and 
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expression to the dogmatism which is at the heart of dialectical materialism. And as 
socialism must, in my opinion, sever its links to dialectical materialism (or completely 
change what is meant by dialectical materialism) if it is to be a democratically 
acceptable form of social criticism, it is important that the revival of what is valuable 
in Althusser’s social philosophy be severed from his democratically unacceptable 
epistemology. Althusser, I believe, stands in the same relationship to dialectical 
materialism as Engels and Marx believed Feuerbach to stand to classical German 
philosophy:24 he is its most sophisticated advocate, and, as such, lays bare the core, 
and core shortcomings, of the philosophy.25 
 I do not think I myself can usefully add anything to the thrust of Norris’ account 
of Althusser’s Spinozism, and in criticism of Althusser’s epistemology I would 
merely refer the reader to that account (and the contrast it poses to Resnick and 
Wolff). What I intend to do in this paper is show what still evidently needs to be 
shown, which is why Spinozist dogmatism is a democratically unacceptable basis for 
critical epistemology.26 I believe the best way to do this for a readership of those 
concerned to evaluate Althusser’s contribution to Marxism is to directly describe to 
 
Development of Plekhanov’s Theory of Knowledge (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991). 
24 Friedrich Engels, ‘Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy’ 
[1886] in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1975ff) vol 26. 
25 I am aware of one similar play on the title of Engels’ book: Gareth Stedman Jones, 
‘Engels and the End of Classical German Philosophy’, New Left Review, I/79 (1973), 
pp. 17-36. No doubt there are others. 
26 Andre Santos Compos, ‘The Problem of the Beginning in Political Philosophy: 
Spinoza After Hegel’ in Hasana Sharp and Jason E. Smith, Between Hegel and 
Spinoza (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2012). 
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them the nature of Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza and its implications for critical 
method. It is not the detailed similarities of Althusser’s and Spinoza’s epistemologies 
that I want to discuss, though I trust that those familiar with Althusser will readily 
recognise them as they emerge particularly from the discussion of the levels of 
knowledge in Spinoza’s thought.27 I want to discuss the fundamental political 
consequences of the absence of subjectivity in Spinozist epistemology. 
 When I have used words related to ‘dogma’ in reference to the epistemologies 
of Spinoza, Althusser and others, I have not done so with the intention of deprecating 
those epistemologies in any direct way but to register that they are based on coherence 
theories of belief in which dogmatism is not a defect but an essential virtue.28 The 
point, however, is that beliefs stated in these terms do not have a form which is 
adapted to the persuasion of others. They are closed systems and their form is adapted 
to the correct statement of the truth. Putting aside the reception of the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus,29 Spinoza’s philosophical views had no little or purchase in 
                                                 
27 C.f. Louis Althusser, ‘On the Materialist Dialectic’ in For Marx (London: New Left 
Books, 1977) pp. 182-93; Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital 
(Lonodn: New Left Books, 1970) p. 90; Louis Althusser, ‘Elements of Self-criticism’ 
in Essays in Self-criticism (London: New Left Books, 1976) pp. 132-41 and Louis 
Althusser, ‘Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy?’ in Philosophy and the 
Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists (London: Verso, 1990) pp. 224-230. 
28 Spinoza ‘was the last major figure until Frege in the Western canon to give a 
subsidiary place to epistemology’ because ‘[t]he practice of religions was never 
understood in a way that required a justification of defensible premises’: Richard 
Mason, The God of Spinoza (Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 248. See further 
Ralph C. S. Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth (London: Routledge, 1989). 




their time, but his life30 and work31 were consciously intended to provide a pattern for 
others to follow. One can, I think without absurdity if one makes proper allowance for 
their radically different circumstances and significance, say something similar about 
Althusser’s response to Stalinism, particularly as it formed an important strand of 
post-war French communism.32 But the philosophical expression of this pattern took 
the form of a correct statement of dogma, and the reception of the dogma by others 
could not be conceived of as other than, in the end, the elimination of their erroneous 
beliefs and the imposition of correct ones in their place. In my opinion, which it will 
become obvious rests on a Kantian commitment to autonomy, this is a disaster for 
forms of social criticism such as socialism which ask of others that they change their 
beliefs. Socialism must seek to persuade, as Marx himself did in Capital but 
dialectical materialism of course did not, and doing so involves rejecting the 
coherence principle of truth. Comment on the political practice of dialectical 
materialism as a system of dogmatic elimination of error by actually existing 
communist power is supererogatory. 
                                                 
30 Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
pt 2. The shift in the broad image of Spinoza, from the contemplative, even reclusive, 
philosopher conveyed by earlier biographies, to the engaged, if not political, 
philosopher portrayed in Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) n.b. ch. 10, is very striking. 
31 Michael Hampe, ‘Rationality as the Therapy of Self-Liberation in Spinoza’s Ethics’ 
in Clare Carlisle and Jornadon Ganeri (eds) Philosophy as Therapeia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
32 Margaret A. Majumdar, Althusser and the End of Leninism (London: Pluto Press, 
1995) and William S. Lewis, Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). 
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 In what follows I will argue that Hegel placed subjective conviction at the heart 
of modern conceptions of epistemology, in rejection of Spinoza’s conception of truth 
as coherence which, no matter how logically compelling given its presuppositions, 
carries no power to convince those who do not accept those presuppositions. The step 
from this to Marx’s own commitment to Hegelian immanent critique as the means of 
winning conviction, so determinedly articulated in Capital, will be clear to those with 
a knowledge of Marx’s work, though I shall conclude by underlining it. 
 
Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza 
The extended critique of Spinoza in Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy 
apparently follows a most conventional line by beginning with an objection to the 
form of the exposition of the Ethics.33 That book’s full title is, of course, Ethical 
Principles Geometrically Demonstrated (Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata), 
and is presented after the fashion of a Euclidean deduction. The first part, 
‘Concerning God’, begins with eight definitions which amount to a statement that 
God is all substance from which the subsequent arguments proceed.34 Now, whilst 
Hegel’s regard for the theistic content of Spinozism extended even to identifying it as 
                                                 
33 In Wolfson’s historically important work, summing up core themes in the modern 
interpretation of Spinoza, the adoption of the geometrical method was regarded as 
tantamount to an opportunistic attempt to borrow the prestige of mathematics: Harry 
A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1934) vol. 1, pp. 53-57. No simple objection to Spinoza’s ‘axiomatic presentation’ 
could, of course, now succeed in light of Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical 
Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
34 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Ethics’ [1677] (hereinafter E) in Complete Works 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2002) p. 217. 
 11 
 
the source of all truth in modern philosophy,35 he seriously objected to this geometric 
form of presentation of that content.36 But it is to his deepening of the, even as he 
wrote, common to the point of being hackneyed criticism of the geometrical form that 
I want to draw attention. 
 Hegel believed that there was a strong contrast between the forms of 
presentation suitable for mathematical as opposed to philosophical truths. Formal 
deduction may be fit to represent the tautological statements of mathematics, which 
follow internally to the abstract system in which they are propounded. It cannot, 
however, express the knowledge of the real provided by philosophical statements of 
absolute truth.37 No doubt specialist objections can be raised against these 
characterisations particularly of mathematical statements, but the valid basis of this 
contrast is that Hegel regards the separation of the content and form of philosophical 
statements of truth unacceptable. In Spinoza’s case, it cannot allow for the intimate 
connections which we will see necessarily exist between the content of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics and the form in which he chose to present these. Hegel had to carry out a 
radical substantive critique of Spinozism in order to demonstrate the truth of that 
system.38 
                                                 
35 Georg W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench and Trubner, 1892-96 [1840]) (hereinafter LHP) vol. 3, pp. 257, 283. 
36 Ibid., pp. 282-7; Georg W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic (Cambridge University Press, 
2010 [1812-16]) (hereinafter SL) pp. 472-73 and Georg W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia 
Logic (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1991 [1817]) (hereinafter L) p. 298 (sec. 
229 addn.). 
37 LHP, vol. 3, pp. 282-85; and PS, pp. 24-28 (paras. 43-47). 
38 L, pp. 226-27 (sec. 151 addn.). 
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 The geometrical form of presentation is unacceptable, Hegel argued, not 
because it distorts Spinoza’s system, but because it accurately expresses the absence 
of subjective processes in Spinoza’s method of proof, which followed from the 
disregard for subjective conviction which we will see is central to that system.39 
Spinozism is the most consistent development of a number of Descartes’ ideas about 
God’s relationship to the created world and how we might describe it. However, 
Hegel showed that the development of the essential achievement of the Cartesian 
philosophy, the elevation of the subject to the position of the arbiter of truth, even of 
the truth of God’s existence, requires the rejection of these ideas.40 What is ultimately 
at issue here is, not a shift from, as it were, Spinoza’s metaphysics of substance to 
Hegel’s metaphysics of spirit,41 but, as Hartmann has put it, the elimination of 
metaphysics,42 brought about by a shift in the ground of epistemological justification, 
from objective systems to subjective conviction.43 
                                                 
39 LHP, vol. 3, p. 287. See further R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1985) ch. 1. 
40 On the influence of Hegel’s views about to Descartes on his critique of Spinoza 
generally see Stanley Rosen, ‘Hegel, Descartes and Spinoza’ in James B. Wilbur (ed) 
Spinoza’s Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976). 
41 J. B. McMinn, ‘A Critique on Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s God’, Kant Studien, 
51 (1960), pp. 294–314 and Henry A. Myers, The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1944) p. 40.  
42 Klaus Hartmann, ‘Hegel: A Non-metaphysical View’ in Alasdair MacIntyre, Hegel: 
A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1972). Moyar has most valuably argued that, to be precise, what is at issue is not 
‘metaphysics’ as such, but ‘[t]he general requirement to make our thinking non-
dogmatic metaphysics’: Dean Moyar, ‘Thought and Metaphysics: Hegel’s Critical 
Reception of Spinoza’ in Eckhart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed (eds) Spinoza and 
German Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 213.  
43 George di Giovanni, ‘Hegel’s Anti-Spinozism: The Transition to Subjective Logic 
and the End of Classical Metaphysics’ in David G. Carlson (ed) Hegel’s Theory of the 
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 This shift naturally had its first expressions in attempts to develop a subjectively 
secure theology, and very arguably the most fruitful philosophical contributions to 
this theme in Enlightenment thought are Kant’s writings on rational theology. But it is 
Hegel who, in a marked instance of his efforts to divine the truth in all preceding 
philosophy, made the intellectual history of this shift most clear. Certainly, the 
contrast is stark between Kant’s treating Christian Wolff as ‘the greatest among all 
dogmatic philosophers’44 and Hegel’s dialogue with philosophy’s past. However, it is 
not so much the depth of Hegel’s knowledge of the history of his discipline as the 
depth of his concern to locate his own work within that history, of which he intended 
to show it was a product, and to justify by showing this, which I wish to emphasise 
here. 
 
Spinoza’s Proof of God’s Existence 
Spinoza demonstrated his belief in God in the following way. He defined the finitude 
of a thing as that thing’s being limited. Limitation occurs through the existence of a 
thing other than the first sharing a common ground with it through which limitation of 
the first is exercised.45 Spinoza then distinguished between a substance and its modes. 
A substance is such a thing that an account of its attributes, that is its essence or those 
 
Subject (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Professor Giovanni has provided a 
most thorough account of the intellectual background in George di Giovanni, 
Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).  
44 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 1998 
[1781]) p. 119 (Bxxxvi). 
45 E, p. 217 (pt. 1, def. 1). 
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qualities of it that are intrinsically bound up in its being the thing it is,46 can be given 
wholly within the thing itself without reference to other things.47 A mode, by contrast, 
is a thing that must be understood by reference to another thing, for its essence lies in 
the substance of which it is, precisely, a modification.48 Modes clearly may limit one 
another. However, a substance cannot be limited, for for it to be so it would have to 
share an attribute with another substance as the common ground of limitation. This is 
impossible, for the two would then have to share an essential quality which constitutes 
their existence as different substances.49 Thus finite substances in the plural cannot 
exist; there can be only one infinite substance.50  
 Furthermore, this substance exists necessarily. As a substance is completely in 
itself, it cannot admit of an external cause, for then an account of the substance would 
have to refer to an external thing which is the cause. A substance therefore has 
existence as an attribute.51 Its existence must be understood as an ‘eternity’, by which 
is meant that its existence cannot be thought to have a beginning and an end as this 
implies limitation, but should be conceived as an eternal, self-securing continuance.52 
In sum, as Spinoza famously put it, a substance is the cause of itself (causa sui).53  
                                                 
46 Ibid. (pt. 1, def. 4). 
47 Ibid. (pt. 1, def. 3). 
48 Ibid. (pt. 1, def. 5). 
49 Ibid., pp. 218-19 (pt. 1, prop. 5). 
50 Ibid., pp. 219-21 (pt. 1, prop. 8). 
51 Ibid., p. 219 (pt. 1, prop. 7). 
52 Ibid., p. 217 (pt. 1, def. 8). 
53 Ibid. (pt. 1, def. 1). 
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 Allowing a definition of God as a being absolutely infinite,54 which Spinoza 
adopts from established theological positions and of which the Ethics may be 
regarded as an unprecedentedly rigorous thinking through,55 it is possible to identify 
God as the one infinite, necessarily existent substance.56 Everything in nature, the 
appearance of finitude in all its forms, is but a modification of God.57  
 
The Epistemology of Spinoza’s Proof 
Hegel’s objection to these arguments as arguments is clear; there is no subjective 
compulsion to believe them as they avoid proving the initial definitions. The 
identification of God with all substance may be correct, but the truth of what remain 
assertions from which all else in the Ethics follows is never established. However, as I 
have suggested, Spinoza’s form of presentation of his metaphysics was by no means 
chosen in ignorance of the necessity of providing a proof of that system. Rather it is a 
presentation which suppresses consideration of the subjective compulsion of belief as 
the proof which it does in fact furnish follows from the metaphysical positions 
presented, and these positions erase subjectivity.58 The way Spinoza took up the 
problem of establishing truth was derived from Descartes, and the significance of this 
is, not so much that the solution given borrows a great deal from Cartesian 
                                                 
54 Ibid. (pt. 1, def. 6). 
55 Carlos Fraenke, ‘Maimonides’ God and Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura’, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 44:2 (2006), pp. 169-215. 
56 E, pp. 222-23 (pt. 1, prop. 11). 
57 Ibid., pp. 224-27 (pt. 1, prop. 15). 
58 C.f. the description of egolessness in Paul Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza (New 
York, NY: New York University Press, 1979) ch. 6. 
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formulations, although it does, but that Spinoza had to take over the posing of this 
problem quite externally to his own system.  
 After Descartes had, from the position of doubt, radically separated subject and 
object, Cartesianism was naturally beset with the problem of reuniting them, and 
conceived of this as a problem of correlating thought and extended bodies, or at least 
accounting for the intuitive conviction of their correlation, after Descartes had rebuilt 
them as two separate substances.59 In an argument even the basic sense of which is 
hard for the contemporary reader to grasp,60 Descartes provided for some connection 
of mind and body through an action of the pineal gland,61 and overall seems to have 
been content with accepting the common-sense necessity of correlation.62 
Malebranche regarded a change in thought or extension as the ‘occasion’ of a 
corresponding change in the other, the occasion being realised by God’s continuous 
intervention to bring it about.63 What has often been regarded as the characteristic 
Cartesian correlation of thought and extension, which treats them as if they were two 
perfectly synchronised clocks, can properly be traced to Arnold Geulincx.64 
                                                 
59 René Descartes, ‘Meditations’ [1641] in Philosophical Writings (Cambridge 
University Press, 1984) vol. 2, pp. 50-62. 
60 On the plausibility of this argument understood, as of course it initially should be, 
as Descartes himself understood it, see Lisa Shapiro, ‘Descartes’ Pineal Gland 
Reconsidered’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 35:1 (2011), pp. 259-86. 
61 René Descartes, ‘The Passions of the Soul’ [1649] in Philosophical Writings, vol. 
1, p. 340. 
62 René Descartes, Conversations with Burman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976 
[1648]) p. 28. 
63 Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997 [1688]) pp. 121-22 (dialogue 7, xiv). 
64 Arnold Geulincx, Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 2006 [1675]) p. 232 (annotation 19 to 
treatise I, ch. II, sec. II, §2). The recent availability of Geulincx’s Ethics in English is 
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Authoritative modern scholarship is radically questioning the value of giving much 
substance to this metaphor, and behind this to our idea of occasionalism as it is 
derived from the metaphor,65 but, with respect to this scholarship, it would still appear 
that all occasionalist ideas as such have recourse to special hypotheses which cannot 
be integrated into the body of Cartesianism and indeed tend to conflict with it. 
Geulincx’s clocks metaphor, for example, would seem to require that thought is as 
equally determined as extension as a condition of their synchronisation, a conclusion 
profoundly at odds with the doctrine of free will.66  
 Spinoza’s own position has affinities especially with the determinism of the 
clocks metaphor, but he was able to dispense with the unsatisfactory recourse to 
special actions by God. Spinoza put an end to all such notions by subjecting the 
conundrums bound up in the attempt to maintain the dualism of thought and extension 
 
no doubt largely due to its being able to be published with Samuel Beckett’s extensive 
notes on the book, and that Beckett made generous acknowledgement of Geulincx’s 
influence on his thought: David Tucker, Samuel Beckett and Arnold Geulincx 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 2012). 
65 Steven M. Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) ch. 1.  
66 This is the implication of this metaphor developed by Leibniz in the doctrine of pre-
established harmony: Gottfried Leibniz, ‘Third Explanation of the New System’ 
[1696] in Philosophical Texts (Oxford University Press, 1988) 192. See further Stuart 
Brown, ‘Malebranche’s Occasionalism and Leibniz’s Pre-established Harmony: An 
“Easy Crossing” or an “Unbridgeable Gap”’ in Stuart Brown (ed) Nicholas 
Malebranche (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1991). From the modern ethical and political 
point of view expressed in Voltaire, Candide (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947 [1759]) 
it is well enough recognised that, if interpreted benevolently, ‘pre-established 
harmony’ is a ridiculous idea. It should also be noted that the determinism involved 
can, if interpreted malevolently, become a terrible idea, graphically portrayed in 
James Hogg, The Confessions of a Justified Sinner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 
[1824]). See further Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York, NY: 
Schocken Books, 1965) ch. 7. 
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to his own rigorous monism.67 His intervention is abruptly conclusive in the 
consistency which it obtains from being developed within a system which aims to 
destroy dualism or indeed any sort of essential pluralism at all. Spinoza argued that 
those attributes which God as the one infinite substance possesses must be infinite as 
God must possess all possible ones, and each must in itself be infinite in the sense that 
it must cover all possible cases which evoke it.68 Each attribute must be wholly 
discrete from and unlimited by any other, for it is an essential quality which cannot be 
shared.69 There are, then, an infinite number of completely different attributes which 
God possesses but, taking up the Cartesian problem, Spinoza focuses upon thought 
and extension.  
 It is a commonplace that Descartes’ rebuilding of the world from the position of 
doubt by no means proceeded according to the strict rules of formal deduction which 
he professed. However, within Cartesianism an emphasis on thought and extension as 
two substances is presented as arrived at by such a deduction. This emphasis can 
therefore be considered to be intrinsically bound up in that philosophy, even if as a 
characteristic weak point. There is no equivalent warrant for such an emphasis in 
Spinoza. When he followed Descartes here, he not only brought thought and 
extension quite empirically into his philosophy, which might equally be said of 
Descartes, but unlike Descartes, he then treated thought and extension as having the 
                                                 
67 See A. Wolf, ‘Spinoza’s Conception of the Attributes of Substance’ in S. Paul 
Kashap (ed) Studies in Spinoza (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972) 
p. 22. 




status of mere inclusions. Within Spinozism the distance between thought and 
extension is not so much explained as explained away, for the special focus upon 
these two attributes is then destroyed as they are collapsed into a lot with any other 
attribute of the one infinite substance.70  
 Spinoza distinguished between ideas of extended bodies within what he 
regarded as the infinite attribute of thought (idea) and the extended bodies themselves 
within what is equally regarded as the infinite attribute of extension (ideata).71 The 
idea of a circle, for example, is distinct from a circle itself; it does not have a centre, a 
circumference, etc. as does the latter.72 When thought and extension are treated as 
infinite attributes of God, rather than as separate substances whose status with regard 
to God’s ultimate substance is ineradicably vague as was the case with Descartes, the 
problem of their correlation totally disappears. As they are both infinite, it is 
impossible that there can be an extended body without an idea of it, nor an idea of an 
extended body without a corresponding extended body.73 In allowing two separate 
attributes, Spinoza’s position seems dualistic, but this is to employ a misleading 
terminology.74 For though these terms capture the appearance of things, they 
completely fail to capture how Spinoza conceived of the truth of this appearance.  
 Thought and extension are only two qualities attributed to God by the human 
intellect; two aspects of the same thing. That they correspond is a misleading way of 
                                                 
70 SL, p. 472. 
71 E, p. 246 (pt. 2, prop. 5). 
72 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect’ [1657-60] 
(hereinafter TEI) in Complete Works, p. 10. 
73 E, p. 227 (pt. 1, prop. 16). 
74 Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962) p. 87. 
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saying that they are of the same substance. The problems of correlating dualistically 
conceived thought and extension are disposed of as the dualism itself is denied. As 
Spinoza puts it: ‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things,’75 and this is so because there is really only one order and 
connection,76 that of the one infinite substance. By treating the human body as part of 
the infinite attribute of extension and the human intellect as part of the infinite 
attribute of thought, Spinoza is able to produce a philosophical psychology, if I might 
put it this way, which completely identifies changes in one with changes in the 
other.77 
 The problem of truth as envisaged in epistemologies of correspondence between 
perception and its object thus becomes irrelevant for Spinoza. His treatment of 
epistemological questions was, as it had to be, wholly situated within the attribute of 
thought. He distinguished between ideas of extended bodies and ideas of ideas of 
extended bodies.78 These latter constitute reflexive knowledge (cognitio reflexiva) of 
the adequacy of ideas, and are the area of knowledge in which a grasp of the truth is 
established.79 As correspondence of idea and ideata can be no basis of truth, reflexive 
knowledge must identify what ideas are true by specifying a criterion of the true form 
                                                 
75 E, p. 247 (pt. 2, prop. 7). 
76 Ibid., p. 246 (pt. 2, prop. 4). 
77 Ibid., pp. 243-77 (pt. 2). 
78 TEI, p. 10. 
79 Ibid., p. 11. 
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of an idea irrespective of content. Hence Spinoza defines the adequacy of an idea as 
that idea intrinsically displaying the marks of truth.80 
 Any distinction between beliefs which is made wholly internally to thought 
must involve a coherence epistemology. Taken individually, no idea of an extended 
body can be untrue. But it is possible to build up ever more complex accumulations of 
ideas which show, by the lack of fit of other parts of the pattern, that these latter are 
relatively false. In the Ethics Spinoza distinguished between three levels of truth.81 
(Apart from mistakes or dream thoughts, which are incoherent even by the standards 
of normal conceptions),82 there is knowledge of the first kind which is termed opinion 
or imagination. At this level, discrete conceptions occur with individual modifications 
of the human body, forming the vague experience (experientia vaga) of unrelated 
ideas. It is possible that certain of these ideas will come to be linked as their precise 
individualities are subsumed under a perception of the resemblances of similar ideas, 
and they will coalesce into a generic type or universal notion (notio universalis). Such 
a notion is still itself confused, being developed from merely an automatic 
psychological process of classification in the human mind and not according to any 
explicitly coherent plan.83 
 However, along with imagination there must be some adequate ideas. In having 
an idea of an extended body it is implied that one gains an idea of those qualities 
                                                 
80 E, p. 244 (pt. 2, def. 4). 
81 E, pp. 267-68 (pt. 2, prop 40 schol. 2). C.f. TEI, pp. 7-10 in which four levels are 
distinguished. I repeat that I will not discuss the way Althusser himself adapted these 
levels and based the epistemological break on them. 
82 Ibid., pp. 15-18. 
83 E, pp. 266-67 (pt 2, prop. 40 schol. 1). 
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which are common to extension as such and which are thus present in the particular 
and the general.84 In contrast to universal notions, these common notions (notiones 
communes)85 are not confused agglomerations but are recognised as logically 
necessary to the conception of extended bodies as such.86 They are the basis of 
knowledge of the second kind, reason. It is from the analysis of such notions that an 
increasingly complex and integrated truth will be reached. The end point of this 
process is the third kind of knowledge, intuition (scientia intuitiva). Intuition is the 
development of reason to the apogee of certain formal consistency, expressing 
complete knowledge in a single, integrated, total system in which all truth is simply 
and immediately available.  
 Spinoza’s conception of the mark of truth is directly indebted to the Cartesian 
position that what is clearly conceived is true, in which clarity of conception is 
identified with Euclidean deduction.87 Spinoza’s first publication codified 
Cartesianism, as far as he felt was possible allowing for its inconsistencies, according 
to the principle of that deduction,88 and the Ethics is a mature reworking of this 
approach. But if Spinoza’s paradigm of truth is developed very directly from certain 
of Descartes’ ideas, the fashion in which it is established as true departs completely 
                                                 
84 Ibid., pp. 265-66 (pt. 2, props. 38-39). 
85 The etymology of this term, which is drawn from one of the names Euclid gave to 
his axioms and which in Spinoza’s philosophic milieu stood for necessarily true 
elements of the human intellect, is most interesting. See Gottfried Leibniz, New 
Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1704]) secs. 
48-51. 
86 E, pp. 265-66 (pt. 2, props. 38-39). 
87 Descartes, ‘Meditations’, op. cit., 37-43. 
88 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Principles of Cartesian Philosophy’ [1663] in Complete 
Works, op. cit. 
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from the sceptical spirit of Cartesianism. Descartes held that it could be possible, 
without proof to the contrary, that even clear ideas of extended bodies could be false 
if God was a deceiver and merely fabricated the conditions which lead to those ideas 
being held to be true. Descartes did in fact regard it as possible to rule out this 
possibility of deception by a deduction from the idea of God’s perfection.89 That 
basing a belief on the truth of clear ideas identified with formal deduction on a 
deduction is an indefensibly circular argument was urged against Descartes by a 
number of his contemporary critics. Although Descartes appears to have believed that 
this objection did not really raise serious difficulties for his philosophy,90 he cannot be 
thought to have satisfactorily responded to it.91 Spinoza is extremely critical of 
Descartes’ ever allowing the possibility of deception, arguing that if one has a clear 
                                                 
89 Descartes, ‘Meditations’, op. cit., pp. 37-43. 
90 René Descartes, ‘Objections and Replies’ [1641-42] in Philosophical Writings, op. 
cit., vol. 2, pp. 100-5, 171 and Descartes, Conversations with Burman, op. cit., 5-6. 
91 How Descartes could miss the force of the objections raised against him here turns 
on an interesting question about the precise sense in which he meant the knowledge of 
God to act as a guarantee of truth: M.J. Levett, ‘Note on the Alleged Cartesian 
Circle’, Mind n.s., 64:182 (1937), pp. 206-13; Alan Gewirtz, ‘The Cartesian Circle’, 
Philosophical Review, 50:4 (1941), pp. 368-95; Willis Doney, ‘The Cartesian Circle’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 16:3 (1955), pp. 324-38; Edwin Curley, Descartes 
Against the Sceptics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) ch. 5 and 
Cottingham’s introduction to Descartes, Conversation with Burman, op. cit., xxvi-
xxxii. Nevertheless, I do not think that the answer to this question of interpretation at 
all affects the applicability of the charge of circularity to Descartes’ fundamental 
epistemological position. For a comprehensive review of the problem see John 
Etchemendy, ‘The Cartesian Circle: Circulus ex Tempore’, Studia Cartesiana, 2 
(1981), pp. 5-42 and Michael Della Rocca, ‘Descartes, the Cartesian Circle and 
Epistemology Without God’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70:1 
(2005), pp. 1-33. Nor, whilst it certainly has its own interest, does it really help 
Descartes’ position to note that a considerable part of his own work, particularly in 
natural science, departs from his formal method: Stephen Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) chs. 3-4. 
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idea of God this immediately precludes this possibility, which it is thus pointless to 
argue against independently.92 At issue here is Spinoza’s general rejection of adopting 
the doubt that is the heart of Cartesianism and which raises the radically sceptical 
possibility of daring to doubt God’s truth.93 
 Spinoza argued that if it is necessary to establish the grounds of any potential 
knowledge prior to the achievement of substantial knowledge as such, then, as the 
knowledge of those grounds is itself a knowledge which presumably would need to 
have its own foundation established, the whole project of doubt is bound to fail as it 
will lead to an infinite regress of argument. This is indeed the characteristic fate of 
foundationalist epistemologies. One consequence of recognising the force of an 
argument such as Spinoza’s has been the profession of philosophic agnosticism with 
respect to truth, and this is perhaps the principal connection of Descartes to the 
development of English empiricism up to Hume.94 In response to such sceptical 
conclusions, Spinoza claimed that by a similar line of reasoning it might be possible 
to show that it is impossible to work in iron, as to do so requires tools but the tools 
needed can themselves be made only after completing the work. If this particular 
analogy may be weak, Spinoza does capture a real issue in the evaluation of 
skepticism.95 However, his own response to this issue is to deny any pertinence at all 
to Descartes’ epistemological questioning from the position of the subject. Spinoza 
                                                 
92 TEI, p. 22. 
93 Descartes, ‘Meditations’, op. cit., pp. 12-15. 
94 David Hume, Enquiries, 3rd. edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1748]) pp. 
149-55. 




insists that allowing a native strength in the human intellect which enables it to 
recognise a true idea is an essential condition of having any truth at all.96  
 This is a position fully supported by Spinoza’s metaphysics. As the second and 
third kinds of knowledge which Spinoza distinguishes are based on adequate ideas, it 
necessarily follows that relative falsity is restricted to only the first kind.97 His 
position clearly involves allowing the adequacy of ideas defined as adequate, but this 
Spinoza is able to do. Reflexive knowledge is itself within the attribute of thought, 
and because of the infinitude of that attribute, every idea, including every adequate 
idea, has a reflexive idea of itself. The reflexive idea of every adequate idea must 
reveal that adequacy if it is to convey the true character of the idea. It is bound up in 
having a true idea that one must thereby know that it is true, otherwise one would not 
have an adequate reflexive idea of it as true. In having a true idea one thereby has the 
standard by which one is able to know it is true and to distinguish it from the false: 
‘truth [is] a standard both of itself and of falsity’.98 I believe that there is an 
irremovable air of casuistry about this to which I will return, but to be sure the 
conclusion follows quite consistently internally to Spinoza’s system.  
 Spinoza was right to observe that in his monistic system the possibility of God’s 
deceit need not be considered as the dualism which would make it possible is 
dissolved and there are no two things which could conceivably be out of phase. It is 
inevitable in Spinoza’s view that there are true ideas, and the epistemological problem 
                                                 
96 TEI, pp. 9-10. 
97 E, p. 268 (pt. 2, prop. 41). 
98 Ibid., pp. 268-69 (pt. 2, prop. 43 schol.). 
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therefore is not one of establishing their truth but of demonstrating it.99 In sum, 
Spinoza says: ‘He who has a true idea simultaneously knows that he has a true idea 
and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived’.100 The problem of truth as such 
has no intrinsic place in Spinozism, and this system is able to completely resolve the 
difficulties of this problem as they arise in Cartesianism by destroying the very 
distinction on which they rest. In this way, Spinozism arguably is the purest 
coherence theory of truth ever devised. It certainly brings to its most confident and 
thorough point the Cartesian attempt to provide the deductive rationalist cosmology 
which had been sought by Galileo.101 But the principal consequence of this is that, as 
we shall now see, Spinozism requires of those who are to believe in it only mere 
surrender to its presuppositions. 
 
The Ethics of Spinoza’s Proof  
An understanding of Spinoza’s ethical philosophy must be grounded in his treatment 
of the problem of relating God the creator to nature the created, which in an important 
sense is a wider problem than correlating thought and extension. In seeming to set 
nature in some sense free of God, separating God and nature gives rise to many of the 
most profound difficulties grasping what sense that can be made of God’s 
omnipotence. As with the distinction between thought and extension, it is more 
accurate to say that Spinoza did not provide a solution to the problems caused by a 
                                                 
99 TEI, pp. 12-3. 
100 E, pp. 268-69 (pt. 2, prop. 43). 
101 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970) pp. 64-65 (sec. 11). 
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dualistic division but destroys the division by incorporating it into his system, the 
rigorous monism of which then dissolves it. Spinoza’s thinking out of the implications 
of God’s infinitude led him to deny that the separation of creator and created can 
arise.  
 If God is infinite, then nature cannot be set aside as separate from God. To use 
what is only an illustrative metaphor, God might extend for an infinite distance 
outside of nature, but if so God cannot possess all the attributes of nature as it is these 
that are allowing us to distinguish nature from God. God thus cannot possess the 
omnipresent, more than quantitative infinitude which Spinoza holds to be essential.102 
For Spinoza, God is the immanent cause (causa immanens) rather than the transient 
cause of nature.103 Rather than being the initial cause of nature which now continues 
on its own course, God is the continuing cause, in the sense of essential ground, of 
nature, being conterminous with nature as the substance of all modification. 
 Although Spinoza distinguishes between nature conceived as a creation (natura 
naturata) and nature as the cause or ground of itself (natura naturans)104 as a way of 
orienting himself to the traditional theological difficulties of God’s relationship to 
nature, the thrust of his system is again towards denying the reality of such a 
distinction. Spinoza referred to the one, infinite substance as ‘God or nature’ (Deus 
sive natura),105 and this became the focal point of the profound antagonism of 
                                                 
102 E, p. 224 (pt. 1, props. 13-14). See further Errol E. Harris, Salvation from Despair 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 33-47. 
103 E, p. 229 (pt. 1, prop. 18). 
104 E, p. 234 (pt. 1, prop. 29 schol.). 
105 Ibid., p. 321 (pt. 4, pref.). 
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traditional theology towards Spinozism which reduced it almost to a scandal better not 
talked about until the end of the eighteenth century.106  
 It is in this connection that we can examine the famous Spinozist maxim that 
‘determination is negation’. This formulation is known from one of Spinoza’s letters 
in explication of his doctrines,107 and is not as such present in the Ethics. Yet the 
principle denoted is itself continually present. It affirms that the particular 
determination of the possession of a quality implies the negation of all other possible 
alternative qualities. Finite things as defined by their particular determinations must 
be the negation of other finitudes. As God is absolutely infinite, it follows that God 
must be the complete negativity of all finitude. That is, as a finite thing negates the 
infinite number of all other determinate finitudes, God, as the substance of the infinite 
number of modes and attributes, must embrace every finite thing. God’s infinitude is 
the ground of every finite thing, for the existence of the thing does not inhere in itself 
but in the partial negation of God’s infinitude. The significance of this treatment of 
determinate finitude is that, as we have seen reached by a different route in the Ethics, 
it renders God’s infinitude not as something beyond finitude but as conterminous with 
it, as the omnipresent ground of each finite thing. This is, as Spinoza puts it in another 
letter, the ‘actual infinite’.108 
                                                 
106 LHP, vol. 3, p. 256. An interesting collection of papers on how Spinoza’s views 
continued to be discussed under these circumstances is Wiep van Bunge and Wim 
Kliever (eds) Disguised and Overt Spinozism Around 1700 (Leiden: brill, 1996). 
107 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Spinoza to Jarig Jelles, 2 June 1674’ in Complete Works, 
op. cit., p. 892 (letter 50). 
108 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Spinoza to Lodewijk Meyer, 20 April 1663’ in Complete 
Works, op. cit., p. 790 (letter 12). 
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 Spinoza’s distance from traditional theology is most starkly apparent in the 
absence of free will in his system consequent upon the above representation of God 
and nature. All finite things are modifications of God’s infinite substance. This 
substance is their essence,109 which is their truth.110 God is infinite and must 
encompass all possible things. The arrangement of finite things cannot be different 
than it actually is, for then the possibilities of the creation of nature would be larger 
than the existent infinite God or nature.111 Spinozism thus allows no possibility for 
maintaining human free will. It is the separation of creator and created which allows a 
space for free will and doctrines of personal salvation. These are lost in Spinoza’s 
monism, and thus he gives a completely deterministic philosophical psychology of 
will and action.112 
 The title Ethics, then, is a paradoxical one, provoking a questioning of the 
normal meaning of ‘ethics’113 in a way which follows from the central theme of 
Spinoza’s whole intellectual effort. Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology and ethics 
are linked together most intimately by a fundamental attempt to redefine the ethical 
away from consideration of how to utilise free will towards consideration of how to 
                                                 
109 E, p. 232 (pt. 1, prop. 25). 
110 Ibid., pp. 232-34 (pt. 1, props. 26-9). 
111 Ibid., pp. 235-36 (pt. 1, prop. 33). 
112 Ibid., p. 235 (pt. 1, prop. 32) and pp. 320-82 (pts. 4-5). See further David Bidney, 
The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza, 2nd. edn. (New York, NY: Russell and 
Russell, 1962). 
113 Alfred J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1976) p. 9 and G. H.R. Parkinson, Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1954) p. 89. 
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come to terms with its absence.114 Spinoza, in a close parallel with his attitude 
towards the problem of truth, regarded free will and the classical problems of ethics as 
illusions which result from an incomplete knowledge of the nature of the human mind 
and body.115 
 The actual tone of Spinoza’s ethics follows from a belief in God’s beneficence 
which enters into his metaphysics from Christian theology, but in the terms of his own 
system this is a completely arbitrary belief for him to adopt.116 I will not discuss the 
blessedness117 of the intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis),118 but rather 
will trace it back to the metaphysics which it colours. The coherent link of the 
metaphysics and the ethics is the quietism of the latter. Spinoza came to terms with 
the absence of free will by redefining freedom as the knowledge of, and thus the 
rational acceptance of and compliance with, complete determinism. This is ultimate 
reason. The central injunction of these ethics is to understand events under the aspect 
of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis).119 As from the point of view of God’s infinitude 
all of existence is set out as an eternal timelessness, to allow the limited human 
intellect’s notion of temporality to affect judgments is an error. Under the aspect of 
                                                 
114 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (Glasgow: Collins, 1962) pp. 28-34. 
115 E, p. 265 (pt. 2, prop. 35 schol.). 
116 A. E. Taylor, ‘Some Inconsistencies of Spinozism’ in Kashap (ed) op. cit., pp. 
292-3. 
117 E, p. 382 (pt. 5, prop. 62). 
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eternity, an event which the intellect places in past is just as significant as one in the 
present or the future, other things being equal.120 
 The full sense of the aspect of eternity emerges when we broaden it from its 
association with ideas of time, to which Spinoza was trying to deny ultimate reality, 
and consider its wider ethical implications. Whilst Spinoza allowed that 
preoccupation with everyday interests constitutes such an enormous obstacle to 
cultivating reason that to expect everyone to order their lives by it is utopian,121 
particular human passions are to be subjected as far as possible to the 
acknowledgment of determinism. The free person is to attempt to approach as near as 
possible to God’s complete knowledge by transcending the limitations of human 
emotions and intellect.122  
 Hegel shows a degree of sympathy with these deterministic consequences of 
Spinozism which allows him to comprehend the underlying conception of the 
relationship of God and nature which gives rise to them. He disputed123 Fichte’s 
allegation124 that Spinoza could not have believed in his own philosophy for it 
contradicts the necessity which he (Spinoza) surely felt to regard his own conduct as 
                                                 
120 Ibid., pp. 229-30 (pt. 4, prop. 42). See further Harold F. Hallett, Aeternitas 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930) pp. 3-33. 
121 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘A Political Treatise’ [1675-77] in Complete Works, op. 
cit., p. 682 (ch 1, para 5). 
122 Thomas C. Mark, Spinoza’s Theory of Truth (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1972) pp. 91-128. 
123 Georg W. F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of 
Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977 [1801]) 87. 
124 Johann G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge (New York, NY: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1970 [1795]) p. 81. See further Allen Wood, ‘Fichte on Freedom: The 
Spinozistic Background’ in Förster and Melamed (eds) op. cit., pp. 121-35. 
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willed by himself. Spinoza, notwithstanding the remarkable degree to which he would 
indeed seem, as far as knowledge of his life extends, to have lived up to his own 
philosophy,125 is quite able to regard such belief in his own free will as might have 
assailed him as the product of his own humanly limited knowledge. But if Spinozism 
may be considered to contain, as it were, convincing replies to simple denials of its 
authenticity, Hegel was determined to press home objections to the suppression of 
subjectivity which in turn take these into account. 
 
Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza: Pantheism and Acosmism 
Let us begin with that most striking and initially famous, or notorious, alleged 
consequence of Spinozism, its pantheism. Hegel in fact regarded criticism of 
Spinozism as pantheistic as incorrectly put. F. H. Jacobi’s Letters on Spinoza, one of 
the most influential discussions of Spinoza in the early Hegel’s philosophical milieu, 
accused Spinoza of atheism126 in that in his pantheistic system there is no 
transcendent God, only nature.127 Against this, Hegel insisted that if pantheism is 
taken as the endowing of nature with the significance of God’s being, then Spinozism 
is its exact antithesis.128 Spinoza denies finite modes any substance. These modes are 
                                                 
125 Abraham Wolfson, Spinoza: A Life of Reason, 2nd edn (New York, NY: 
Philosophical Library, 1969) and Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, op. cit. 
126 Friedrich H. Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn (1785)’ in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill University Press, 1994), p. 233: ‘Spinozism is 
atheism’. 
127 Ibid., p. 219: ‘[Spinoza’s] God … does not belong to any species of things; it is not 
a separate, individual, different thing’. 
128 LHP, vol. 3, pp. 280-2; and L, pp. 97 (sec. 50), 226-27 (sec. 151 addn.). 
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perceived by the human intellect, and this intellect and the bodies it perceives are in 
God certainly. But they are regarded as being wholly insubstantial, being only 
modifications of the one substance. The truth of modes is that they have no ultimate 
reality. Spinoza’s belief, Hegel showed, is acosmistic rather than pantheistic;129 it 
turns on destroying finitude and declaring only the infinite God to be real.  
 Though Hegel found this feature of Spinozism to be, not an atheism,130 but a 
content that he described, as we have seen, as the source of truth in modern 
philosophy, this by no means was unreserved praise of Spinoza’s system. Rather it 
was a profound criticism, though one which is just the opposite of Jacobi’s. The 
shortcoming involved here is not that God is excluded, but rather that, in Hegel’s 
words, there is ‘too much God’.131 The statement that God is the substance of all 
finite modification is so abstract that there is no enlightenment in it. There is no 
specific relation between any particular determination and the ground of itself in God, 
and though God might be the immanent cause of all modification, nothing is thereby 
gained with respect to knowing the specific cause of any particular modification. The 
infinite is reduced to being merely a great void into which all things may be cast, but 
                                                 
129 F. C. Copleston, ‘Pantheism in Spinoza and the German Idealists’, Philosophy 
21:78 (1946), pp. 42-56 and Yitzhak Y. Melamed, ‘Acosmism or Weak Individuals? 
Hegel, Spinoza and the Reality of the Finite’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
48:1 (2010) pp. 77-92 and G. H. R. Parkinson, ‘Hegel, Pantheism, and Spinoza’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 38:3 (1977), pp. 449-59, 450. 
130 Efraim Shmueli, ‘Hegel's Interpretation of Spinoza's Concept of Substance’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1:3 (1970), pp. 176-91 and Efraim 
Shmueli, ‘Some Similarities Between Spinoza and Hegel on Substance’, The Thomist, 
36:4 (1972), pp. 645-57. 
131 LHP, vol. 3, p. 282. 
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in so being cast, are merely lost.132 Spinoza took the particular qualities which he 
empirically found in experience and destroyed them by demonstrating what he 
believed is their truth, for that truth is that they are wholly inessential, and this may be 
captured in the one statement that they are of God.  
 This lack of any concrete relation of the finite and the infinite is the occasion of 
some of Hegel’s most striking aphorisms. In simply treating all finitude as of God we 
are given ‘the night in which all cows are black’.133 This infinitely sweeping truth is 
not, as it stands, of value, and it is not because it is so completely embracing. Just as 
to say ‘all animals’ does not constitute a zoology, so this reduction of all finitude to 
one infinite is uninformative.134  
 
Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza: Finitude and Subjectivity 
Hegel’s critique of the destruction of the reality of finitude in Spinozism amounts to 
more than showing that there are certain unfortunately deterministic implications of 
Spinoza’s position for subjectivity. It demonstrates that it is impossible to establish 
that position. We have seen that the rigour of Spinoza’s monism dissolves certain 
seemingly perennial problems such as the proof of truth and the comprehension of 
creation. To even orient his system to such problems Spinoza was compelled to use a 
forced terminology which has no integrated place in the Ethics. The connotations of 
duration of time in the idea of causality, for example, are obviously completely 
                                                 
132 Ibid., pp. 287-89. 
133 PS, p. 9 (para. 16). 
134 Ibid., p. 11 (para. 20). 
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foreign to the aspect of eternity, and in Spinozism ‘cause’ denotes something much 
more like logical ground rather than cause and effect. In respect of the use of the 
language of correspondence in the treatment of truth, Spinoza made it plain that he 
would have wished to revise the entire vocabulary of the conceptualisation of this 
issue.135 In his ethics we have seen the extent to which he carried through such a 
revision to the extent that free will seems to be annihilated. But how far can this way 
of dealing with dualisms which have continually been used to discuss seemingly 
existential intractable problems, be pursued?  
 Let us consider the basic distinction between finite modes and infinite substance 
which lies behind the various dualism we have seen Spinoza dissolve. Now, in the full 
sense of God’s omnipresence at which Spinoza is driving this distinction disappears. 
But if this is allowed, it obviously will include the very sense of the original 
distinctions through which it is itself developed. Spinoza’s reduction of all finite 
modifications to one substance in order to make God omnipresent cuts two ways. 
After the reduction robs the modes of their truth, how are we to understand Spinoza’s 
own beginning which allows such modes? Starting with a distinction between finite 
modes and infinite substance and attempting to completely erase the former to leave 
the latter makes the starting point itself incomprehensible.136 Kojève no doubt went 
                                                 
135 E, pp. 269-70 (pt. 2, prop. 44 schol.). 
136 Schelling’s critique of Spinoza is acute on this point: Friedrich W. J. von 
Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1988 
[1797]) 28: ‘as it came from his hand [Spinoza’s] system is the most unintelligible 
that ever existed’. See further Friedrich W. J. von Schelling, On the History of 
Modern Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1833-34]) pp. 64-75. 
Schelling’s critique of Spinoza is discussed generally in Dalia Nassar, ‘Spinoza in 
Schelling’s Early Conception of Intellectual Intuition’ in Förster and Melamed (eds) 
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too far but the point he makes cannot be dismissed: ‘to take Spinoza seriously is 
actually to be – or to become – mad’.137 The crucial point is that an attempt to 
dispense with the finite limitations of the human intellect must founder as those 
limitations are the only material that intellect has.138  
 If we return to the form of the presentation of Spinoza’s system, it is now 
possible to clearly see what Hegel found so unsatisfactory about it; far more than a 
question of style. The geometric form, Hegel and many others alleged, furnishes no 
proof of the initial definitions. However, the full meaning of those definitions emerges 
only as one goes further into the Ethics, and it is quite possible to begin from almost 
any point in the first part and recapitulate the initial definitions. Those definitions 
themselves could also surely be reformulated. It is certainly both inaccurate and 
unhelpful, then, to attempt closely to identify these definitions as such as the 
fundamental, illicit presumption upon which Spinozism rests without consideration of 
the background strengths (and weaknesses) of that system.139 But this can hardly be 
held to vitiate Hegel’s critique.  
 This is so, in the first place, for a textual reason. Apart from the commentary on 
the Ethics in his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel does not in fact pay any 
regard to the letter of that text but proceeds from the maxim that determination is 
 
op. cit. and Michael Vater, ‘Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity and Spinoza’s Ethica 
more geometrico’ in Förster and Melamed (eds) op. cit. 
137 Kojève, op. cit., p. 120. 
138 J. M. Frizman and Brianne Riley, ‘Not Only Sub Specie Aeternitatis But Equally 
Sub Specie Durationis’, The Pluralist, 4:3 (2009), pp. 76-97. 
139 Parkinson, op. cit., pp. 57-90. 
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negation, which he thought ‘the absolute principle of Spinozism’.140 I have argued 
above that this maxim captures the principle of Spinoza’s treatment of the relation of 
the finite and the infinite, set out in a different fashion than in the Ethics, and in this I 
have followed the typical way in which Hegel discusses Spinoza.141 This textual point 
leads us to one of more substance. It is in the principle of its treatment of finitude and 
infinitude that Hegel locates Spinozism’s ultimate unacceptability. Spinoza perforce 
allows, in a number of ways which capture human experience, a contrast between 
finitude and absolute infinitude into his system, but far from being integrated into that 
system they undergo the extinguishing of their meaning within it.  
 This surely undermines the epistemological and ethical injunctions put forward 
in the Ethics. Aspiring to a life completely ordered by reason may, as we have seen 
Spinoza recognise, be hindered by immersion in everyday interests, and so equally 
might ascending to the third level of knowledge be handicapped by a lack of 
commitment to the necessary effort.142 However, it is not merely difficult to attain 
these excellent and rare143 goals as they are established in Spinozism. The true, the 
good and the freedom which possession of them can generate are set up by Spinoza as 
goals only God can realise.  
                                                 
140 SL, p. 472. 
141 Yitzhak Y. Melamed, ‘Omnis Determinatio Est Negatio?’ in Förster and Melamed 
(eds) op. cit., pp. 175-96. 
142 TIE, pp. 3-4. 
143 E, p. 382 (pt. 5, prop. 62 schol.). 
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 Spinoza wanted to say that the more we approximate to the aspect of eternity, 
the more we are realising our perfection.144 But this runs against the monolithic 
quality of intuition which secures the good and the true by a consistency which denies 
a positive value to any approximations. If the good and the true are unreachable and 
the limitations of any finitude are absolutely insubstantial under the aspect of eternity, 
then it is impossible to grasp the motivation and significance of any such effort of 
improvement of knowledge and ethical conduct as that to which Spinoza devoted his 
life. The example set by that life can be coherently followed only by being integrated 
into another philosophical145 or theological146 ethics. In Spinozism itself there seems 
to be an unbridgeable gulf between human subjectivity and those goals.  
 Such a gulf is in fact very literally present in Spinoza’s three kinds of 
knowledge. As we have seen, there actually are two distinct types of epistemology 
involved in the kinds of knowledge, a distinction which Spinoza himself did not 
recognise and which cross-cuts the presentation of the kinds of knowledge as the 
progressive series he certainly intended.147 In what is in fact a convergence with early 
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empiricism and especially Hobbes rather than with Descartes’ rationalism,148 
Spinoza’s category of imagination provides an empirical psychology of experience. 
Spinoza’s account of this first kind of knowledge is not concerned with the potential 
adequacy of the ideas found in it but rather with explaining the existence of ideas 
other than adequate ones.  
 It will be recalled that experientia vaga - itself a significantly Baconian 
expression149 - is composed of individual ideas occurring with particular 
modifications of the finite human body. Because of the finitude of the human body 
and intellect, such discrete ideas must arise and so it is inconceivable that there could 
ever be a human situation without such imaginations. They are psychologically part of 
the human lot.150 However, not only does this argument show that it is impossible to 
dispense with error, but it also tends to establish that there is no possibility of gaining 
truth.  
 Universal notions based on the coalescence of imaginations are not adequate 
ideas, and are indeed separated from the ground of adequacy in common notions. 
There is no progression but rather a complete break between universal and common 
notions. Common notions have no root in experientia vaga, and turning to the second 
kind of knowledge it is clear that the adequate principle upon which ideas are now to 
                                                 
148 TEI, p. 9 n i. 
149 Francis Bacon, ‘The New Organon’ [1620] in The New Organon and Related 
Writings (Indianapolis, IN: Library of Liberal Arts, 1960) p. 94 (bk. 1, aph. 98). See 
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be ordered wholly departs from the earlier psychological account and involves the 
criterion of coherence. Allowing some common notions gives even the human 
intellect some truth from which Spinoza might deduce more. But the source of the 
notions is not in the human intellect; it is in the system to which they will give 
access.151 Their truth is guaranteed by the criterion of coherence which is contrasted 
to the, as it were, incoherence of experientia vaga. The gulf between the first and 
second types of knowledge is that between the types of knowledge possibly generated 
from the human intellect and the truth, the truth involving the denial of reality to 
imaginations. 
 Spinoza attempted to give this departure an anchor within the human intellect 
when he claimed that that intellect must have the native strength to recognise true 
ideas. But the crucial word here is ‘recognise’ as the truth of certain ideas is, it will be 
remembered, guaranteed by Spinoza’s metaphysics and he was thus able to pursue the 
consequences of certainly having at least some true ideas in reflexive knowledge. I 
remarked above that I thought there was an irremediable casuistry about this position, 
despite its following consistently within Spinoza’s system. This casuistry lies in there 
being a failure within Spinoza to link truth to the limited human intellect, which 
necessarily leads him into a circular argument when attempting to prove that truth. 
Native strength is itself dependent upon the metaphysics and yet, of course, the truth 
of the metaphysics turns on allowing it.  
                                                 
151 Guttorm Fløistad, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge Applied to the Ethics’ in 
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 Spinoza seems to have been to some degree aware of this profound difficulty, 
and at one point claims that the human intellect shares some part of God’s eternal 
quality, grounding some idea of human immortality.152 I cannot presume to generally 
understand Spinoza’s treatment of immortality, which has confounded the greatest of 
Spinoza scholars,153 but I think it unarguable that Spinozism requires that the 
individual intellect must in some way have an immortal aspect.154 Hegel’s critique 
shows that the crucial failure of Spinozism is that it fails to link truth to finite human 
subjectivity, and this does seem to be the source of Spinoza’s related failure to give 
any proper sense to this quality of immortality. Native strength does not cover the gap 
here but rather covers it up. After all of Spinoza’s rethinking of Cartesianism and 
cutting through of its paradoxes, his proof of the existence of God founders in a way 
that has clear affinities to Descartes’ problem of circularity, not least in that it leads to 
postulating what is only a special hypothesis in the context of his system, the 
immortality of sharing in God’s eternal quality.  
 This should tell us, as it told Hegel, that issues far more fundamental than the 
specific constructions of any system are being raised. Spinoza developed the objective 
truth of the theological components of Cartesianism through to the most coherent 
statement of their truth, and that statement makes it clear that such truth annihilates 
subjective knowing. But the very finality of the coherence of this statement marks a 
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radical historical change in historical perspective. The truth of modern philosophy 
since Descartes is that we must begin with the human subject. It is on this ground that 
Hegel shows that Spinoza’s system must be regarded as unfounded.155 
 
Conclusion: Hegel, Marx and Immanent Critique 
The point for us here, however, is that a number of historically important modern 
philosophies have not recognised that truth must lie in subjective conviction. 
Dialectical materialism, including its, in my opinion, most sophisticated statement by 
Althusser, has been historically the most important of these. A link between the 
subjective beliefs of those who must be convinced and the truth of the Marxist 
positions is never established, save as the correction of the error of beliefs dismissed 
as false consciousness and corrected by the political action of those who are (for 
reasons not themselves properly explained) in possession of the truth. In this 
conclusion, I will say a little more about Hegel’s place amongst the positions taken 
towards Spinoza in contemporaneous German philosophy as a preliminary to turning 
to the significance of his critique of Spinoza for contemporary socialism. 
 I have mentioned that the discussion of Spinozism in the philosophical milieu of 
the early Hegel was highly influenced by Jacobi’s Letters on Spinoza. Jacobi displays 
a firm conviction that to try to prove the existence of the infinite God by means of the 
finite human intellect is quite contradictory. The very truth of that infinitude implies 
the transcendence of the truths of the intellect. As he regarded the content of 
Spinozism so highly, it would seem that Hegel had much the same as Jacobi to say, 
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but in fact Hegel and Jacobi push in quite opposite directions. The thrust of Jacobi’s 
criticism is that the atheism he finds in Spinoza is the necessary consequence of any 
attempt to move from the finite to the infinite by means of reasoned argument, and 
Jacobi’s own philosophy accordingly expressed an attempt to establish an immediate, 
intuitive grasp of the truth of God.156 This is obviously an entirely different idea of 
‘intuition’ to that found in Spinoza, one which paradoxically tries to make its being 
rooted in an unsystematic, unsupported assertion the ground of its adequacy to the 
totality of the infinite. But it entirely captures the necessity of mere assertion of truth 
that Spinoza himself cannot eliminate from his own epistemology.  
 Hegel certainly follows Jacobi to the extent that he agrees that absolute truth 
cannot be established after the fashion of Spinoza’s method.157 But whereas Jacobi 
regards coherent subjective knowing as inevitably inadequate to faith in God, for 
Hegel the issue is to develop a faith adequate to subjective knowing.158 Turning upon 
his insistence that Spinozism is acosmistic rather than pantheistic, Hegel’s project is 
not to carry out a destruction of finitude which Spinoza failed to complete but rather 
                                                 
156 Jacobi, ‘Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
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to allow finitude a coherent place even in absolute truth. In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel puts forward a conception of Spirit, an epistemology and an ethics which 
all give subjectivity a location within the absolute.159  
 I do not doubt that, in terms of identifying exactly what is indefensible about 
Spinozism, Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof160 is the most devastating 
criticism furnished by classical German idealism.161 When existence is shown to be 
incapable of being logically predicated of even God’s being, then the Ethics collapses 
into a sort of word spinning which could not possibly realise its aims.162 However, 
this sort of criticism would be meaningless were it itself not made in a context where 
subjective judgment is given epistemological privilege as the criterion of conviction 
in a belief, even belief in God.163 Consolidating the achievements of Descartes, 
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Earle to mount a remarkable defence of the ontological argument: William A. Earle, 
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Hegel’s critique of Spinoza makes this most fundamental shift in human perspective 
the issue.164 
 Unless it distinguishes between Marxism as dogma and Marxism as the thought 
of Karl Marx, then an attack on Marxism as a theology is not merely drastically unfair 
to Marx but also to Hegel as a major source of Marx’s views. This is a textual 
argument now barely worth making. But I trust the argument here shows just how 
inaccurate this attack is in principle. What is actually being criticised in this attack is 
not so much belief in a secular God as dogmatism of belief, and in this sense Hegel’s 
epistemology cannot be criticised as religious as it is in principle non-dogmatic. 
Hegel’s metaphysic arises from his failure to sustain observance of this principle. One 
is obliged to say that Hegel’s attempt to demonstrate the existence of God, even in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, is, despite the extraordinary power of various or perhaps 
even all of the separate arguments in that book, overall, not merely uncompelling, but 
completely implausible. It is in this sense that even the Phenomenology can be 
regarded as a metaphysic in the way Hartmann has shown Hegel sought to avoid. 
Hegel did anticipate the conclusions of the Phenomenology and the Phenomenology 
does not justify them according to the standards of winning subjective conviction 
through immanent critique which Hegel established. The Phenomenology is a 
demonstration of those conclusions which makes continuous reference to the subject, 
 
‘‘The Ontological Argument in Spinoza’ in Grene (ed) op. cit. p. 219 (see also the 
following chapter ‘The Ontological Argument Twenty Years Later’).  
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have ‘worsened the situation’: Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics 




but in the end gives the subject no truly autonomous status as it figures in Spirit’s self-
realisation.165  
 As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere,166 Marx’s economics, both as he 
himself, by making the greatest efforts, arrived at what can properly be regarded as 
his own positions, and as he painfully sought to express those positions to those who 
engaged with them, were a thoroughgoing immanent critique of classical political 
economy. The positions of classical political economy were initially accepted, and the 
argument for socialism and communism arose from pursuit of the resolution of the 
contradictions which critique exposed in those positions, which were expressive of the 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. The argument originated in the 
subjective beliefs of those committed to the capitalist mode of production and could 
succeed only if it could, in principle, convince those persons to alter their beliefs in 
order to resolve the contradictions in those beliefs. It was, in principle, an argument 
which had to work, and could only work, through persuasion.  
 It did not, of course, work, and I have elsewhere argued that this was because 
communism, as Marx overall had it a utopian condition of blissful relief from 
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scarcity, cannot be derived from the critique of classical political economy,167 which, 
in addition to pointing towards the necessity of overcoming capitalism, also points to 
scarcity being an ineluctable, indeed existential, condition.168 This is much less 
important here than seeing that Marx’s critique of classical political economy was one 
that, in principle, could win subjective conviction, and it is my opinion, which 
motivates the writing of this paper, that a non-communist immanent critique of 
economics, which I will persist in calling a socialist critique of economics, is the pre-
requisite of progress beyond capitalist limits. 
 Of course, if the argument of this paper is accepted, we are left with the crucial 
problem in the interpretation of Althusser of understanding the thinking behind 
‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ and other valuable perceptions of the 
ineluctable complexity of social formations when that thinking cannot be reconciled 
with Althusser’s Spinozism. And herein lies the fundamental paradox of Althusser’s 
Marxism. ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ is the result of the combination of 
Marx’s thought with theories which cannot possibly be regarded as owing their origin 
or status to that thought; Freud as approached via Lacan being the principal one. The 
result is sometimes excellent because it is convincing to those with an interest in 
social theory and an open mind. But this is not how Althusser wanted ‘Contradiction 
and Overdetermination’ to be evaluated. He wanted it to be evaluated as a statement 
of Marxist dogma (in the sense I am using the term). This required him to claim that it 
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United Kingdom (Prague: Charles University Press, 2003). 
168 David Campbell, ‘How Sensible is the Left-wing Criticism of Money, Exchange 
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had an origin in Marx’s thought, which in turn led him to grossly misrepresent what 
Marx actually had thought. The cost to Althusser himself of doing so was great, for as 
he doggedly maintained this misrepresentation, and the method of reading behind it, 
the ridiculousness of his formal dogmatic claim overwhelmed the considerable 
substantive interest of what he had done, and he became rightly subject to the type of 
criticism represented by Kolakowski’s disdain. 
 It is a very welcome aspect of the re-evaluation of Althusser since his death that 
previously difficult to obtain works of the 40s and early 50s have been brought to 
prominence and translated into English.169 In these works, though it is a shock to 
those, like myself, who came to know Althusser through his work of the 60s and 70s, 
we see Althusser’s own positive engagement with Hegel, and if the rejection of 
Althusser’s dogmatic epistemology takes with it the epistemological break literally 
understood, not only as applied to Marx but to Althusser himself, then important lines 
of investigation are opened up. But this is, of course, for the future.  
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